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SHAREHOLDERS AS STAKEHOLDERS: CHANGING
METAPHORS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
RONALD

M. GREEN*

Metaphors are unavoidable but dangerous components of human thought.
Every effort to visualize or make concrete complex concepts is selective,
highlighting some ideas while eclipsing others. The resulting mental image
also may evoke strong emotional and moral reactions. As Robert Jay Lifton
has shown, Nazi genocide rested on an elaborate metaphor, which described
the regime's racial victims as "vermin" or "bacilli," and which presented
mass extermination as a program of public health.'
Despite the appearance of precision, treatments of corporate governance
in the literature of economics, public policy, and law also have often been
controlled by metaphors. Behind such specialized legal terms as "fiduciary
obligations" or "the principal-agent relationship" are a series of mental
pictures-metaphors-which have molded both professional and popular
thinking.
Consider Milton Friedman's classic 1970 article The Social Responsibility
of Business Is to Increase Its Profits.2 Friedman's objective in this article
was to argue against the expanded managerial obligations then being championed by defenders of "corporate social responsibility." To this end,
Friedman does two things at the beginning of his discussion. First, he tells
us that, because advocates of social responsibility usually focus on corporate
behavior, he will concern himself with corporate executives rather than
individual business proprietors. Second, he presents what he regards as an
incontestable description of the relationship existing between all business
owners, including shareholders, and those individuals who are paid to
manage the business:
In a free-enterprise, private-property system a corporate executive
is an employe of the owners of the business. He has direct responsibility to his employers. That responsibility is to conduct the
business in accordance with their desires, which generally will be to
make as much money as possible while conforming to the basic
rules of the society, both those embodied in law and those embodied
3
in ethical custom.
Astute readers of Friedman's essay will see that they have been proffered
a metaphor: a highly selective and concrete image of the role, function,

* Dartmouth College and the Amos Tuck School of Business Administration.
1. ROBERT J. LUTON, THE NAzI DOCTORS: MEDICAL KILLING AND THE PSYCHOLOGY OF
GENOCIDE (1986).

2. Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Its Profits,
N.Y. TIms, Sept. 13, 1970 (Magazine), at 32-33, 122, 124, 126.
3. Id. at 33.
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and responsibilities of the executives of large public corporations. Before
our eyes, the image of the modern corporation has vanished, to be replaced
with one drawn from Dickens. Managers of large public corporations and
the millions of institutional investors who know the companies in which
they invest, if they know them at all, only as lines in a quarterly report,
are replaced by Bob Cratchit and Scrooge.
With his metaphor in place, Friedman's moral argument is sealed.
Managers are bound by explicit and implicit promises made to shareholders
they have freely agreed to serve and who have put their trust and property
in the managers' hands. Of course, no one can be required to perform
illegal or flagrantly unethical deeds, and this explains the qualifications
Friedman places on managers' obligations to the shareholder. Nevertheless,
within these modest constraints, managers owe their primary loyalty to those
who agree to pay their salaries. Diversion of resources or managerial time
to other "worthy causes" constitutes taxation without representation, or,
more in line with Friedman's actual metaphor, embezzlement.
Friedman's defense of managers' duties to shareholders is nearly a
quarter of a century old, yet its spirit lives on in the concepts-and
metaphors-that continue to dominate the law of corporate governance.
Within this sphere, senior managers are held to have fiduciary duties to the
corporation and its shareholder "owners" that stem from special obligations
managers freely incurred when they agreed to serve as "agents" for their
corporate "principals." As fiduciaries, senior managers have an affirmative
obligation to disclose relevant business information to other corporate
decisionmakers. Senior managers must act loyally to the corporation, avoid
taking personal advantage of information or opportunities that come their
way; and act with the same care and diligence in corporate matters as they
would in their own affairs. 4 This last obligation includes an open-ended
duty to maximize shareholders' wealth. In the words of the American Law
Institute's draft Principles of Corporate Governance, those responsible for
a business corporation should have as their objective "the conduct of
business activities with a view to enhancing corporate profit and shareholder
gain." 5 Although managers and corporate directors are permitted, in the
reasonable exercise of "business judgment," to take longer-term shareholder
interests into account and sometimes to defer immediate shareholder gain,
all management decisions must be oriented toward the goal of maximizing
shareholder value.

4. In addition to the need for senior manager to act loyally, avoid taking personal
advantage, and use care and diligence, Robert C. Clark adds to these three attributes of
corporate fiduciaries a fourth attribute of the case law in this area: its quality of "moral
fervor" and "intrusive normative rhetoric" regarding fiduciaries' obligations. See Robert C.
Clark, Agency Costs Versus Fiduciary Duties, in PRINnIALs AND AGENTS: THE STRUCTURE OF
BusiNEss 55, 76-79 (John W. Pratt & Richard J. Zeckhauser eds., 1985).
5. PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GovERNANcE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 2.01
(Tent. Draft No. 2, 1984), quoted in The Committee on Corp. Laws of the Am. Bar Ass'n,
Other Constituencies Statutes: Potentialfor Confusion, 45 Bus. LAW. 2253, 2255 n.4 (1990).
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Over the years, voices have been raised against this dominant metaphor.
From E. Merrick Dodd in the early 1930s to R. Edward Freeman in the
1980s and 1990s, economists, legal theorists, and moral philosophers have
tried to assert a plurality of obligations incumbent on senior managers and
corporate directors. 6 In the field of business ethics, "stakeholder" and
"multi-fiduciary" theories of the firm have been advanced as ways of
recognizing the potentially devastating impact corporations can have on
their internal and external constituencies and of empowering senior managers
and directors sometimes to subordinate shareholder interests to those of
employees, communities, or other groups affected by corporate activities.
Recently, the argument that corporate management should consider the
interests of many constituencies appears to have attained some hearing
within the world of corporate law. A handful of Delaware court decisions
have modestly expanded the business judgment rule to allow corporate
directors to take into account the impact of their decisionmaking on other
corporate "stakeholder" groups, especially employees and local communities. 7 These decisions, however, require that measures taken on behalf of
other constituencies produce "some rationally related benefit accruing to
the shareholders." 8 Over the past two decades, twenty-eight .states have
passed "other constituency" statutes permitting, though usually not requiring, senior managers and corporate directors to consider the interests of
other stakeholders. 9 Charles Hansen notes that these statutes are "remarkably consistent" with one another. 0 Generally, they permit directors, while
acting in the best interests of the corporation,to take into account a variety
of constituencies other than shareholders, including employees, communities, customers, and suppliers." Because these statutes, with few excep-

6. R.

EDWARD FREEMAN

&

DANIEL

R.

GILBERT, JR., CORPORATE STRATEGY AND THE

SEARCH FOR ETmics (1988); R. EDWARD FREEMAN, STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT: A STAKEHOLDER
APPROACH (1984); E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., For Whom Are CorporateManagers Trustees?, 45
HARv. L. REv. 1145 (1932).
7. See Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del.

1986) ("A board may have regard for various constituencies in discharging its responsibilities");
Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985) (suggesting that business

judgment rule allows directors to consider, among other factors, 'effect of takeover on
"creditors, customers, employees, and perhaps even the community generally" when enacting

defensive measures).
8. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 176. This decision imposes the further requirement that once
the corporation has entered a phase of being auctioned among active bidders, the directors'
only concern is securing the highest price per share. Id. at 182.
9. Charles Hansen, Other Constituency Statutes: A Search for Perspective, 46 Bus.
LAw. 1355, 1355 (1991).
10. Id.
11. The Minnesota statute is typical in this regard. It reads:
In discharging the duties of the position of director, a director may, in considering
the best interests of the corporation, consider the interests of the corporation's
employees, customers, suppliers, and creditors, the economy of the state and nation,
community and societal considerations, and the long-term as well as short-term

interests of the corporation and its shareholders including the possibility that these
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tions,12 specify that the impact on other constituencies must have a rela-

tionship to the best interests of the corporation, understood in terms of
shareholder gain,' 3 they represent little more than codifications of the
business judgment rule as it has recently been interpreted by the Delaware
courts.' 4 As a result, it seems fair to say that these legal developments do
not really challenge the dominant principal-agent, fiduciary metaphor and,
in some respects, they even reinforce it. Court decisions have widened the
latitude of fiduciary decisionmaking, but they have not altered its ultimate
priorities. In every .case, the claims and welfare of other corporate stakeholders must also serve the long-term interests of shareholders, a strict
requirement. If we consider that "other constituency" statutes often were
passed in reaction to the takeover battles of the 1980s and that these statutes
moderate directors' duties to shareholders only in the context of mergers
or acquisitions, the claim that these statutes represent a fundamental change
in corporate legal perspectives is weakened further. By and large, these
statutes aim to strengthen the hand of management in its efforts to ward
off "third party" hostile raiders, or upstart managers, whose conduct
threatens more traditional lines of corporate control and obligation.
This suggests that there is still need for basic rethinking of the metaphors
that underlie our views of corporate governance. Beyond the details of
corporate law, the owner-employee, principal-agent fiduciary metaphor continues to shape society. The hold of the metaphor is undeniable, but how
valid is it? To what extent does the image of owners who entrust their
wealth to hired managers accurately portray the underlying human and
moral realities of the modern corporation?
interests may be best served by the continued independence of the corporation.
MniN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.251(5) (West Supp. 1993), cited in Hansen, supra note 9, at 1355
n.3.
12. Hansen singles out the statutes of Connecticut, Iowa, Indiana, and Pennsylvania
(especially the latter's 1990 amendments) as the only ones among the 28 that permit or require
directors to place other constituencies on a footing with stockholders. Hansen, supra note 9,
at 1370, 1375. The Committee on Corporate Laws of the American Bar Association places
Georgia's statute in this category. The Committee on Corp. Laws of the Am. Bar Ass'n, supra
note 5, at 2262-63.
13. The Committee on Corp. Laws of the Am. Bar Ass'n, supra note 5, at 2265.
14. There is considerable debate about the significance of other constituency statutes and
their potential for imposing weightier duties on directors and senior managers than are currently
imposed by the business judgment rule. Among those arguing that these statutes may be
interpreted as having significant impact are Lawrence E. Mitchell, A Theoretical and Practical
Frameworkfor Enforcing Corporate Constituency Statutes, 70 TEx. L. REv. 579, 631-35 (1992)
and David Millon, Redefining CorporateLaw, 24 IND. L. Rav. 223, 245-46, 251-60 (1991).
Both authors urge interpretations that, among other things, would view these statutes as
granting nonshareholder groups enforceable rights and standing to sue. At the opposite extreme,
the Committee on Corp. Laws of the Am. Bar Ass'n, supra note 5, argues for subsuming
these statutes to the business judgment rule. Intermediate positions that see these statutes as
potentially broadening the meaning of the traditional "duty of care" are offered by Eric W.
Orts, Beyond Shareholders: Interpreting CorporateConstituency Statutes, 61 GEo. WAsH. L.
REv. 14, 40-44, 84-92 (1992) and Stephen M. Bainbridge, Interpreting Nonshareholder Constituency Statutes, 19 PEPP. L. REv. 971, 1019-23 (1992).
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As powerful as the fiduciary and principal-agent metaphors have been,
it is not hard to see that in many ways, they misrepresent the realities of
the shareholder-management relationship. In a recent paper, the philosopher
John Boatright signaled several incongruities in the vision of employeemanagers and corporate directors bound as trustees for corporate owners. 5
One problem, long acknowledged in corporate law, is that ownership of a
corporation is significantly different from the ownership of personal possessions. By and large, shareholders have no right to control the use of
corporate assets. Control is vested in a fictitious person, the corporation,
under the supervision of the board of directors. Senior managers and
directors are fiduciaries not to the "shareholder-owners" of the firm, but
to the corporation. Berle and Means discussed this separation of ownership
from control more than half a century ago 6 and it has been revisited more
recently in the context of takeover activity in the work of Michael Jensen
and Richard Ruback. 17 This separation complicates the simple and morally
compelling picture of owners exercising their will through agents whom they
have expressly hired for that purpose and who correspondingly owe them
duties of loyalty and service. In fact, in exchange for a good return on
their investment, shareholders of public corporations have, by everyone's
admission, already relinquished most of what we normally think of as the
8
powers of ownership.'
The image of shareholders as owners-principals who enter into solemn
agreements with either senior managers or directors breaks down further if
we seek to identify any of the promises, covenants, or contracts, which this
vision presumes. At what point do shareholders and managers ever freely
enter into a relationship in which one party promises to perform specified
services in return for payment or other consideration? Most shareholders
purchase stock on the open market from other shareholders. They have no
face-to-face dealings with senior corporate managers or directors. As Boatright observes,
the idea of a contract is most at home in situations in which two
parties are able to negotiate a set of mutual obligations which

15. See John R. Boatright, The Shareholder-ManagementRelation and the Stakeholder
Paradox (paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Society for Business Ethics, Atlanta,
Ga., Aug. 6-7, 1993).
16. ADou' A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANs, THE MoDERN CoRPoRATION AND
PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932).

17. See, e.g., Michael C. Jensen & Richard S. Ruback, The Market for Corporate
Control: The Scientific Evidence, 11 J. FIN. EcON. 5 (1983).
18. Clark observes that shareholders' rights are "extremely limited." Clark, supra note
4, at 57. Foremost among them are the right to vote for or against candidates for directorships
and the right to vote for or against so-called "organic corporate changes" such as mergers,
charter amendments or the dissolution of the corporation. Id. But the board must first approve
such changes and put them before the stockholders for approval. Clark notes that "even a
100 percent vote of the stockholders cannot initiate or force through such a change" if the

board resists. Id.
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governs specific interactions. In the case of shareholders and management, however, there is virtually no opportunity for the two
parties to negotiate the terms of their relation. 19
There is also little need for such negotiation. Within the traditional
principal-agent, fiduciary view of the firm, it is obviously important that
owners make clear what they expect managers to do on their behalf. Owners
have tied up their capital in the enterprise and, like patients who have given
control of their bodies to a physician or clients who have put their fate in
an attorney's hands, they are thereafter hostage to their fiduciary's decisionmaking. Even when owners and managers have not entered into formal
agreements, implicit contracts governing such relationships might be supposed since it is reasonable to assume that all parties to such an arrangement
would have agreedthat managers should act as trustees for the vital resources
owners give them. But shareholders of a modern corporation hardly are as
dependent as most people who rely on the conduct of fiduciaries. In most
cases today, they commit only a small portion of their wealth to any one
firm. With diversified portfolios, their overall risk in investing in a firm is
relatively low. Indeed, some shareholders may even profit elsewhere in their
portfolio as a result of reverses suffered by one of the firms whose stock
they own. 20 Furthermore, if they do not like the policies or directions taken
by a firm in which they have invested, they are free at any time to sell
their stock in a very active public market. In these respects, shareholders
today have little commitment to the firms in which they invest: they are
neither committed to a firm, in the moral sense of caringabout its prospects,
nor are they committed in the practical sense of having joined their fate to
the company's. This essential lack of commitment by shareholders creates
a moral reality very different from that presumed in the owner-agent model
or in any form of fiduciary relationship.
One other feature of the corporate form, limited liability, contributes
to this lack of shareholder commitment. Traditionally, ownership of property has implied privileges: the right to enjoy one's possessions and to
exploit the freedoms and opportunities they represent. Ownership also has
always implied responsibility for the harms that one's property can inflict
on others, but, by and large, this has been a minor consideration in most
people's thinking. Those who flagrantly abused or neglected their property
might, at worst, lose it. In the late twentieth century, however, as a result
of unprecedented growth in our technological capabilities and the scope of
business activities, we have entered another realm. As any banker can attest,
in a world of Superfund toxic clean-up legislation, property can be a
dangerous and expensive liability. In a host of industries, including pharmaceuticals, chemicals, energy, and transport, the misuse of corporate

19. See Boatright, supra note 15, at 3 (quoted by permission).
20. This point is made by Michael P. Dooley in a defense of enhanced managerial
authority vis-A-vis shareholders. See Michael P. Dooley, Two Models of CorporateGovernance,
47 Bus. LAW. 461, 526-27 (1992).
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property and technologies can kill or maim hundreds or thousands of people
and cause damages in the tens of billions of dollars. The record of the past
two decades is littered with disasters of this magnitude: A.H. Robins and
the Dalkon Shield; Union Carbide and Bhopal; Johns-Manville and asbestos;
Exxon and the Valdez oil spill; and, most recently, Dow-Corning and
silicone breast implants.
What does this burgeoning tendency of corporations to become potential
sources of massive harm mean for our traditional principal-agent, fiduciary
metaphor? The very idea of fiduciary relationships was developed to protect
principals from the serious harms that their agent might cause them. But
what happens when the conduct of the principal and the agent together
becomes a source of serious harm to others? Naively, we might think that
such a prospect is easily assimilated to the principal-agent model. To the
extent that a principal and agent act jointly, they should bear the costs of
the harms their behavior creates. If I deliberately instruct or knowingly
permit someone to use my property in a way that injures others, we are
both responsible to those we have harmed. But in the world of corporate
law and corporate fiduciary relationships, this expected moral logic does
not apply. Thanks to limited liability, shareholders can fund the activities
of large corporations, receive dividends and capital gains on their investments, and yet remain immune to some of the costs of misconduct or
misjudgment by their corporate agents.
In the past, this consequence of limited liability may not have been
apparent. Corporate failures largely meant insolvency, and the burden of
insolvency usually was distributed either among shareholders, who saw the
value of their stock wiped out, or creditors, who knowingly put their money
at risk. But in today's world, limited liability represents a potentially massive
benefit to shareholders. Because of it, they are immune to pursuit, beyond
their equity stake, by individuals or groups the corporation has injured. In
economic terms, we can think of limited liability today as a "social subsidy"
in the form of an unpaid insurance policy awarded investors that protects
21
them against the bottomless liability which corporate misconduct can entail.
As Christopher Stone has put it, thanks to limited liability, "[w]e have
arranged things so that the people who call the shots do not have to bear
the full responsibility.'""
In fact, shareholders do not "call the shots" (although senior managers
and directors, who also are protected by "limited liability," often do). The
21. The economic and tax implications of limited liability are explored by Kose John,
Lemma W. Senbet, and Anant K. Sundaram in an unpublished working paper. Kose John et
al., Limited Liability and Corporate Taxation (1989) (unpublished paper available through
Dartmouth College). John, Senbet, and Sundaram argue that the double taxation of corporate
income is partly justified as compensation to society for the protection that limited liability
accords the owners of firms engaged in risky activities. Kose, Senbet, and Sundaram develop
the implications of limited liability for multinational business in a second article. Kose John
et al., Cross-BorderLiabilityof MultinationalEnterprises,Border Taxes, and CapitalStructure,
FmN. MM-r., Winter 1991, at 54.
22. CHRISTOPHER STONE, WHERE THE LAW ENDs 46 (1973).
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point is that shareholders are not property owners, nor principals to their
agents, nor individuals dependent on fiduciaries in any of the normal ways
that these concepts and images bring to mind. Shareholders neither control
corporate property nor bear the consequences of its abuse in any of the
ways that the traditional owner-employee metaphor suggests. Why, then,
should we insist that moral relations between shareholders and senior
managers or shareholders and directors, relations emphasizing strict fiduciary
obligations, pertain, when these relations belong to a moral world that does
not exist?
One answer is that we simply have been misled by our metaphors or
bewitched, as Wittgenstein put it, by our language. To some extent, I think
this is true. As a teacher of Masters of Business Administration students, I
repeatedly have witnessed the force of the principal-agent metaphor. Students with little knowledge of corporate law, but a few years of work in
business environments, seem naturally to assume that for both moral and
prudential reasons they must primarily be committed to maximizing shareholder wealth.
Even sophisticated theorists seem to fall under the spell of this metaphor.
In a recent article, business ethicist Kenneth Goodpaster presents what he
terms the "stakeholder paradox." According to Goodpaster, orienting corporate decisions by values that go beyond the long-term maximization of
shareholder gain "seems essential, yet in some ways illegitimate." Goodpaster is willing to accept what he calls a "strategic stakeholder" position,
although he questions its worth as a moral commitment. His strategic
stakeholder position permits management to take into account the impact
of its decisions on other stakeholders to the extent that the impact on other
stakeholders has consequences for long-term shareholder wealth. For such
a view, shareholders remain the pole star of managerial decisionmaking.
But Goodpaster is less comfortable with what he terms a "multi-fiduciary"
view that would insist on giving senior managers or directors equal obligations to a plurality of corporate stakeholders. Why so? Why is Goodpaster
unwilling to relinquish the moral primacy of the shareholder-management
relationship? Part of the answer, it seems, is that he cannot get the owneremployee, principal-agent metaphor out of his mind:
It can be argued that multi-fiduciary stakeholder analysis is simply
incompatible with widely-held moral convictions about the special
fiduciary obligations owed by management to stockholders. At the
center of the objection is the belief that the obligations of agents
to principals are stronger or different in kind from those of agents
to third parties.24
Goodpaster's solution to the "stakeholder paradox" is to retain the primacy
of management's fiduciary obligations to shareholders but to acknowledge
23. Kenneth E. Goodpaster, Business Ethics and Stakeholder Analysis, Bus. ETmics Q.,
Jan. 1991, at 53, 63.
24. Id.
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that, as moral agents, senior managers and directors also have general moral
obligations to other constituencies and groups. Just as I cannot ask my
attorney to commit wrongs or totally ignore her conscience on my behalf,
so shareholders cannot expect managers to put their consciences aside as
they pursue the goal of shareholder wealth. In Goodpaster's view, this way
of configuring responsibilities helps explain the force of various stakeholder
perspectives without surrendering our moral intuitions about the nature of
the owner-manager relationship. The problem with this approach is that we
normally believe fiduciary obligations are special. They can lead doctors
and lawyers to downplay or even suspend important moral obligations to
third parties as they try to protect the interests of their patient or client.
Applied to corporations, placing primacy on managers' and directors'
fiduciary obligations to shareholders can mean that corporate officers might
be allowed to inflict serious harms on other stakeholders while fulfilling
their special moral mission. The question remains why, apart from the tug
of a metaphor, we want to authorize corporate managers to act in this way.
In fairness to Goodpaster and others, we should note that more than
emotionally and morally tinged images lie behind this privileging of obligations to shareholders. Good reasons have been put forth for refusing to
place shareholders on a moral plane of equality with other corporate
stakeholders. Oliver Williamson, for example, points out that, apart from
the assumption of special duties owed to them by management, shareholders
are among the least protected of corporate constituencies. Unlike workers,
suppliers, or creditors, they are unprotected by explicit covenants or contracts and are unable periodically to renegotiate the terms of their relationship.Y
Others fear the loss of control or managerial arrogation of power that
might ensue if any kind of multi-fiduciary model replaced current lines of
responsibility. Managers responsible to everyone are responsible to no one.
In a world in which management has to evaluate every major corporate
decision in terms of its impact on a variety of often conflicting constituency
interests, corporate decisionmaking might be paralyzed and the private
enterprise system as we know it, with its virtues of efficiency and productivity, might vanish. In the words of the American Bar Association's
Committee on Corporate Laws, "[w]hen directors must not only decide
what their duty of loyalty mandates, but also to whom their duty of loyalty
runs (and in what proportions), poorer decisions can be expected."2' Alternatively, some fear that if managers are empowered to set constituency
against constituency, in the end all power will fall into management's hands.
The "control problem" that has bothered corporate theorists for decades
would go from being technically difficult to conceptually unsolvable. A half
century ago, responding to Dodd's multi-fiduciary stakeholder position,
Adolf Berle expressed this concern when he warned that Dodd's view of

25. OLIVER E. WILAmsoN, THE EcoNoMIc INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM 304-05 (1985).
26. The Committee on Corp. Laws of the Am. Bar Ass'n, supra note 5, at 2269.

1418

WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50:1409

corporate managers is trustees for various constituencies could well lead to
a "social-economic absolutism of corporate administrators." 27
All these are serious concerns. Nevertheless, one has the impression in
reading these and other arguments that the whole that is being defendedthe vision of traditional owner-manager relations-seems larger and more
compelling than the sum of its parts. However, taken individually and
collectively, these arguments do not constitute a very convincing justification
of the principal-agent, fiduciary model. Despite Williamson's contentions,
for example, it is hard to believe that shareholders are somehow more
vulnerable than other corporate stakeholders. We have seen how much
latitude the transferability of corporate equities gives this group. Contrast
this with the bulk of employees today, who serve "at-will" and are unprotected in their basic livelihood by contracts or law. Can it really be said
that employees (or local communities or dependent suppliers) are really
better able to "negotiate" the terms of their relationship to the corporation
than are shareholders?
The argument about loss of corporate control merely assumes that it is
impossible legally or ethically to impose on managers and directors a
multiplicity of significant but potentially competing obligations and to hold
them accountable for fulfilling them. In fact, fiduciaries of various sorts
commonly find themselves pulled between compelling duties. In complex
negotiations or when they serve groups of clients, attorneys frequently are
asked to represent multiple parties whose interests do not coincide. So long
as they act with everyone's permission and fully disclose what they are
doing, this mode of conduct is regarded as both possible and permissible.
Some years ago, Justice Brandeis coined a term for those who act in
situations of this sort when he called them "lawyers for the situation."' 8 It
is also now an established principle of legal ethics that lawyers have
obligations to the court for the administration of justice2-for example,
the obligation to prevent perjury and to avoid complicity in it 3 0-that are
as compelling as their fiduciary duties to the client. These competing duties
approximate a multi-fiduciary view of lawyers' responsibilities. Although
such conflicts are less common in medicine, they can be expected to
proliferate as physicians and nurses work in increasingly complex organizational and professional environments. Already, in areas like genetic counseling, practitioners find themselves serving' multiple individuals within families
whose interests often compete. In all these instances, professionals are
expected to do the best they can both by developing and working within a
framework of reasonable and defensible priorities. Why cannot corporate
directors and senior managers be asked to do the same?
27. Adolf A. Berle, Jr., For Whom Corporate Managers Are Trustees: A Note, 45
HAgv. L. REv. 1365, 1372 (1932).
28. See GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR., ETmcs iN THE PRACTICE OF LAw 58-68 (1978).
29. MODEL CODE OF PROFsssIoNA REsPONSMBrY Canon 1 (1983). "A lawyer should
assist in maintaining the integrity and competence of the legal profession." Id.
30. MODEL RutLs OF PRoFssSoNAL CONDUCT Rule 3.3 (1993).
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I do not intend here to develop the outlines of a multi-fiduciary view
of managerial responsibilities." Such a view, I suspect, will be the outcome
of years of painstaking legal reasoning. If the relatively new "other constituency" statutes are not interpretively subsumed by the older "business
judgment" and "managers as fiduciaries for the shareholder" framework,
or if the few exceptional statutes that now permit directors sometimes to
privilege other constituencies over shareholders become more representative
of law in this area, this direction of legal innovation may represent the
beginning of a multi-fiduciary approach. Eventually, we would expect the
elaboration of a body of law estabiishing a slate of varied priorities for
corporate management. Within this framework, shareholders would be one
stakeholder group among others. Normally they would be regarded as primus
inter pares in the sense that they have priority in day-to-day fiscal decisionmaking. But their interests might be explicitly subordinated in cases in which
certain kinds of serious inconveniences or harms threaten other stakeholders.
Of more immediate concern is the question of why it is important to
move beyond the hold of the "manager as fiduciary" or the "principalagent" metaphor. Since a multi-fiduciary stakeholder perspective normally
will require attention to shareholder gain, and since a modified shareholder
view permits consideration of other constituencies' interests when these are
reasonably related to corporate business interests, what really is the difference between these two approaches? Do we have a case here of going east
or west around the globe, but ending up in essentially the same spot?
I do not think so. In practice it can make a significant difference under
which metaphor and which specific model of governance corpPrate management operates. The difference will become apparent whenever corporate
decisions arise in which acting on moral, as opposed to legal, responsibilities
to other constituencies cannot readily be justified in terms of long-term
shareholder gain. The traditional model, we have seen, requires managers
to obey the law, even if this means subordinating shareholder gain. And
the model permits them to act on moral obligations to stakeholders when
these can reasonably be related to increasing shareholder wealth. What this
model does not permit is for managers to respect even their strongly felt
moral obligations when acting on them clearly fails to augment the value
of shareholders' holdings, or may reasonably be construed as tending to
damage shareholders' long-term positions.
It may seem that situations like this are not very likely to occur, but,
in fact, as a result of the scope and magnitude of modern corporate
activities, they have become quite common. The Bhopal disaster provides a
good example.32 Senior managers at Union Carbide and at Union Carbide's

31. Suggestions as to the possible course of these developments are made by Orts, supra
note 14, at 98-100 and Mitchell, supra note 14, at 635-36. For an ethical as opposed to legal
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Indian affiliate, Union Carbide India Limited, were apprised of the poor
maintenance conditions and general disrepair of the company's Bhopal
facility. It may well be that failure to correct these problems resulted only
from miscommunication and the kinds of confusion that can occur in a
large international organization. But Union Carbide's failure to invest
heavily in the Bhopal plant can also be seen as the outcome of a chain of
business reasoning predicated on the shareholder model. To begin with, the
chances of an accident were relatively slight and these had to be weighed
against the major outlays needed to bring the Indian facility up to United
States' standards. Because the Bhopal plant had been losing money for
several years and had no prospects of turning around, it would have been
hard for any senior manager concerned with quarterly results to justify such
costs. Of course, it might be argued that even the slight risk of massive
injury attendant upon an accident, and the consequent liability costs, could
justify such expenditures under some application of the business judgment
rule. But a series of specific considerations undermine this line of reasoning.
For one thing, there was substantial likelihood from Union Carbide's
perspective that liability could be confined to its Indian affiliate. Sheltered
behind international legal boundaries and the rule of limited liability, Union
Carbide's American and Indian shareholders might well be financially better
off if managers 'gambled against safety. Furthermore, even if the almost
unimaginable worst case scenario became reality-the two thousand deaths
and thousands of injuries that actually occurred-the very low economic
value of Indian lives made reduced attention to safety a reasonable gamble
from Union Carbide's perspective. I do not wish to argue that senior
managers at Union Carbide could not have made a case, within the framework of the business judgment rule, for investing in plant safety as a way
of protecting the long-term interests of the corporation, especially if they
had hindsight knowledge of what actually happened. My point is that they
would have had a hard time making such a case. Within the traditional
model of fiduciary responsibilities these managers would: be in the difficult
position of arguing that slight risks to human life and health justify incurring
relatively high and unreasonable costs.
Union Carbide's situation is not unique. Modem corporations frequently
find themselves in circumstances in which reducing the risk of serious harm
to stakeholders is both expensive and not legally required. The law may be
mute because, as in the case of the Dalkon Shield, relevant legal enactments
may not have been developed yet, or, as in the case of Union Carbide, a
multinational corporation may be acting between jurisdictions and without
clear legal direction. When situations of this sort arise, only managers'

TIH ETHIcAL MANAGER (1994). For other discussions of the Bhopal disaster, see Arthur
Sharplin, Union Carbide of India, Ltd.: The Bhopal Tragedy, CASE RES. J., 1985, at 229,
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personal moral convictions may stand between the risk of massive harm to
others and the dominant legal-ethical imperative of maximizing shareholder
value. Sometimes, as the recent experience of Johns-Manville shows, a
moral commitment to other stakeholders may require a willingness to exhaust
the resources of the company, something that the shareholder fiduciary
model will not allow, at least until the law intervenes and compels it. That
these situations arise more and more frequently, as a result of the power
and risks of modem corporate activities, tells us that the weaknesses in the
traditional model are not just theoretical. They evidence themselves in actual
corporate decisionmaking and in this way can potentially contribute to the
infliction of serious harm on stakeholders.
Some might argue that these risks and dangers of the shareholder
model, though substantial, are more than offset by other risks created once
corporate management is freed from its primary duty to increase shareholder
wealth. I respect these arguments and do not intend to show here that they
are wrong. But it is important to note that this discussion takes place on
the plane of public policy. The question concerns which model of corporate
governance makes most sense and best serves all of our needs in a modernbusiness environment. 33 We will have to answer this question by looking at
the specific strengths and weaknesses of different models.
We will not be helped in this debate, however, if our emotions and
thinking are constantly distorted by a faulty metaphor of "risk-taking
owners" and the "loyal managers" they employ. That metaphor, I have
argued, has no relevance to contemporary corporate reality. It is time to
cast it off and let it lie with the Ghost of Christmas Past.

33. This is the same conclusion reached by Boatright when he insists that the debate
over fiduciary obligations rests not on contract or agency but on considerations of public
policy. See Boatright, supra note 15, at 5-8.

